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deductions (except to the extent of nonbusiness income) 31
and nonbusiness capital losses (except to the extent of
nonbusiness capital gains),32 taxpayers run the risk of losing
the home office deduction,33 losing part or all of the
deduction for an IRA contribution.34 and the deduction for
health insurance costs.35  This would suggest careful
attention to net income calculations before year end when
there is still time to influence the level of income and
deductions for the year.
FOOTNOTES
1 I.R.C. § 172.  See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 30.10
(1996); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.05[4] (1996).
2 I.R.C. § 172(b)(3).
3 I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A).
4 E.g ., King v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-231 (loss of
deductibility of health insurance costs, home office expense
and IRA contribution).
5 I.R.C. § 280A(a).
6 I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5).
7 Id.  See King v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-231; Grinalds v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-66 (home office activity generated
sufficient gross income for real estate developer to be allowed
home office deduction and avoid loss limitations on
deductions).
8 Id.
9 King v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-231.
10 See Grinalds v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-66 (depreciation
on home office claimable even though Schedule C showed loss
because taxpayer acquired, constructed, improved, leased,
managed and sold commercial real property from home office
which was reported on Schedules B, D and E; court held that,
given taxpayer’s leasing and sales activity, these amounts
constituted business income).
11 I.R.C. § 162(l)(1).
12 See I.R.C. § 401(c)(1).
13 I.R.C. § 162(l)(2)(A).  See generally 4 Harl, supra n. 1, §
28.02[6][d].
14 See I.R.C. § 1402(a).
15 I.R.C. § 401(c)(2)(A)(i).
16 See I.R.C. § 1402(a).
17 See King v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-231.
18 See I.R.C. § 3121(g).
19 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(15)(i).
20 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(15)(ii).
21 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(15)(iii), (iv).
22 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(15).
23 Id. This point seems not to have been considered in the recent
case of King v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-231.
24 I.R.C. § 219(a).  See Treas. Reg. § 1.219-1(a).
25 I.R.C. § 219(b)(1).
26 I.R.C. § 401(c)(2)(A).
27 See I.R.C. § 1402(a).
28 See ns. 17-22 supra.
29 I.R.C. § 172(d)(3).
30 I.R.C. § 172(d)(1).
31 I.R.C. § 172(d)(4).
32 I.R.C. § 172(d)(2).
33 I.R.C. § 280A.
34 I.R.C. § 219(a).
35 I.R.C. § 162(l).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISCHARGE. The debtor was a logger who contracted
with a third party to log trees under a 50/50 contract. The
debtor checked the county records and discovered a right of
way to the third party’s land over the plaintiff’s land. The
debtor notified the plaintiff about the right of way and
testified that the plaintiff allowed the use of a road for the
logging operation because the right of way was over
swampy land. The debtor also testified that the plaintiff
agreed to the removal of trees on the plaintiff’s land under
the same 50/50 arrangement, although no written contract
was executed. The plaintiff inspected the operation and
complained about the damage to the road and, at a later
inspection, discovered a large number of trees had been
removed from the plaintiff’s land. The plaintiff informed
the debtor of the findings and forbid any future use of the
road. The debtor complied with the request. The plaintiff
claimed that the debtor received payment for the trees cut
from the plaintiff’s land but converted the payments to the
debtor’s personal use.  After the debtor filed for bankruptcy,
the plaintiff filed claims for the lost trees and damage to the
road. The plaintiff then filed a motion to have the debts
declared nondischargeable under Sections 523(a)(4)
(larceny or embezzlement) or (a)(6) (malicious and willful
injury). The court held that the debts were dischargeable
because the plaintiff did not demonstrate any malicious
actions by the debtor in removing the trees, damaging the
road or failing to make payments under the contract. The
court characterized the relationship of the parties as
contractual with the plaintiff’s damages as within the
normal course of business between contract parties. In re
Hrim, 196 B.R. 237 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 1993).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS. The debtors had
owed money to the SBA. After that debt was due, the
debtors contracted with the ASCS (now FSA) for
conservation programs under which the debtors would
receive annual deficiency payments. The SBA instituted an
administrative setoff which was properly approved by the
ASCS. Some payments were made within 90 days before
the debtors filed for bankruptcy and the trustee sought
recovery of these setoff payments as preferential transfers.
The Appellate Panel held that the ASCS and SBA lacked
mutuality so that the setoff was not binding in the
bankruptcy case and ordered recovery of the payments.
However, the court en banc reversed, holding that the
United States was a unitary creditor for bankruptcy
purposes. The case was remanded to the panel for
determinations as to whether the setoff was allowed under
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the bankruptcy rules. In re Turner, 84 F.3d 1299 (10th
Cir. 1996), rev’g and rem’g, 59 F.3d 1041 (10th Cir.
1995).
REOPENING OF CASE. The debtor was a dairy
farmer who was forced into bankruptcy because of an
alleged infection of the debtor’s herd by cows purchased
from a corporation. The debtor filed a lawsuit against the
corporation which was pending at the time the debtor filed
for Chapter 7. The debtor did not include the lawsuit on the
schedule of assets and did not file any information on the
lawsuit until the day the discharge was granted in the case.
The lawsuit proceeded to a large jury award for the debtor
four years later but the verdict was overturned by the trial
court and was on appeal. The U.S. trustee filed a motion
three months later to reopen the Chapter 7 case to include
the lawsuit and its potential award. The award was large
enough to leave the debtor with millions of dollars after full
payment of all creditors; however, the debtor argued that
the doctrine of laches prohibited the reopening of the case.
The court held that the reopening was not prohibited by the
doctrine of laches because the debtor failed to prove that the
trustee knew about the lawsuit during the Chapter 7 case,
that the trustee unreasonably delayed in bringing the
reopening motion after learning about the lawsuit and that
the debtor was prejudiced by the reopening. The court held
that the equity of the case favored reopening the bankruptcy
case to prevent the debtor from reaping a windfall far in
excess of creditors’ claims. In re Windburn, 196 B.R. 894
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1996).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
CONVERSION. The debtors were farmers who
originally filed under Chapter 12. In previous rulings in
their case, the debtors were found to have made fraudulent
transfers of property during their case and the case was
converted to Chapter 7. Although the issues had been
litigated in early decisions and appeals, the debtors again
argued that their case could not be converted to Chapter 7
involuntarily because an involuntary case could not be filed
against a family farmer. The court reiterated its prior rulings
that the debtors had made fraudulent transfers and that a
Chapter 12 case could be involuntarily converted to Chapter
7. In re Graven, 196 B.R. 506 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996).
See also In re Graven, 138 B.R. 587 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1992), aff'd by unrep. D. Ct. dec., aff'd , 64 F.3d 453 (8th
Cir. 1995).
PLAN . The debtors’ Chapter 12 plan provided for
payment of a secured claim owed to a Farm Credit Bank
over the life of the plan at 7.5 percent. The original loan had
an interest rate of 8.75 percent. The Bankruptcy Court did
not confirm the plan because the interest rate was less than
the prime rate plus 1.5 percent for the risk factor. The
appellate court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court decision. The
court rejected the debtors’ argument that the interest rate
could not exceed the contract rate. Koopmans v. Farm
Credit Services, 196 B.R. 425 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor, an attorney, failed to file
income tax returns for several years. The debtor had filed
returns while in the military and during school. The IRS
filed a motion to have the tax for the non-return years
declared nondischargeable. The court held that under
Matter of Bruner, 55 F.3d 195 (5th Cir. 1995), the debtor’s
failure to file income tax returns was sufficient to make the
taxes nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(1). In re
Parker, 196 B.R. 338 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1996).
ESTATE PROPERTY. The IRS filed a Notice of Levy
on the debtor’s IRA, consisting of mutual funds, one day
before the debtor filed for Chapter 13. The debtor sought to
avoid the levy as made postpetition and to include the IRA
in estate property. The court held that the evidence showed
that the levy was filed before the bankruptcy case was filed;
therefore, the levy did not violate the automatic stay. The
court also held that, because the IRA consisted of intangible
property, the debtor retained sufficient rights in the IRA at
the time of the bankruptcy filing to include the IRA in estate
property subject to administration in the case. In re
Boutilier, 196 B.R. 323 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1996).
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES. The taxpayers were
debtors in Chapter 11 and owned several interests in
partnerships and corporations which passed to the
bankruptcy estate. The debtors’ interests were passive
activities for income tax purposes and the debtors had
unused passive activity losses incurred pre-petition. The
partnerships and corporation incurred additional unused
passive activity losses during the bankruptcy case. The
bankruptcy plan provided for transfer of the partnership
interests and stock back to the debtors on the effective date
of the plan. The bankruptcy estate was created in August
1991; therefore, Treas. Reg. § 1.1398-1(c) did not apply
unless the estate made an election to have the regulation
apply. The estate did not make the election. The IRS ruled
that upon the transfer of the partnership and corporation
interests back to the debtors, the passive activity losses also
transferred to the debtors. Ltr. Rul. 9611028, Dec. 14,
1995.
SETOFF. The debtors owed income taxes for pre-
petition tax years and filed for Chapter 7 on April 15, 1994.
On May 6, 1994, the IRS set off the debtors’ 1993 federal
income tax refund against the pre-petition 1992 taxes. The
parties agreed that both the refund and tax liability were
pre-petition items and that if the IRS had timely applied for
relief from the automatic stay, the setoff would be allowed.
The debtors’ sole assets were federal and state tax refunds
which were significantly small in comparison to the
debtors’ debts. The trustee sought recovery of the refund,
arguing that Section 724 required application of the refund
for the payment of administrative expenses before recovery
by the IRS. The court held that the IRS would be allowed
retroactive relief from the automatic stay because the
amount set off would not have a significant impact on the
bankruptcy case and the IRS should not have to be
penalized for failing to timely file for relief from the
automatic stay in this case. In re Morgan, 196 B.R. 758
(E.D. Ky. 1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
FARM LOANS. The FSA has issued interim
regulations implementing the statutory provisions governing
loans assessments, market placements, and the graduation
of seasoned direct borrowers to the guaranteed loan
program. 61 Fed. Reg. 36916 (July 9, 1996).
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PEANUTS. The FSA has issued interim regulations
implementing the Agricultural Market Transition Act of
1996 by (1) eliminating the national poundage quota floor,
(2) eliminating the undermarketing carryover provisions, (3)
establishing temporary seed quota allocations, (4)
establishing the ineligibility of certain farms for quota
allocation, (5) authorizing inter-county transfer of farm
poundage quotas, (6) eliminating the special allocations of
increased quotas for certain Texas counties, and (7)
establishing new provisions for “considered produced”
credit for transferred quotas. 61 Fed. Reg. 36997 (July 16,
1996).
WAREHOUSES. The plaintiffs were grain producers
who stored grain in a federally licensed warehouse and lost
grain because the warehouse failed to maintain sufficient
stocks to cover liabilities. The plaintiffs sued the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for failure of the
Warehouse Division of the USDA (WD/USDA) to properly
inspect and monitor the grain in the licensed warehouse.
The United States argued that the suit was barred by the
discretionary function exception and by the
misrepresentation exception, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a), (h). The
facts at trial showed that the WD/USDA had discovered
several violations at the warehouse over several years,
including shortages and improper storage conditions but
that the warehouse usually corrected the problems within a
short time. However, in one instance, the storage problems
were solved by the warehouse removing the grain from the
storage area and the WD/USDA failed to determine where
that grain was placed. That removal of grain substantially
contributed to the final shortage that caused the warehouse
to lose its license and the plaintiffs to lose their grain which
was stored with the warehouse. The court found that the
WD/USDA generally complied with its regulations and
internal procedures in that nothing in the history of the
warehouse warranted any special inspections or monitoring,
until the removal of the grain from the improper storage
area. Therefore, the court held that the earlier inspections
were within the descretionary function exception but that
the exception did not apply to the inspections required for
determining the status of the grain removed from the
improper storage area. The court held that the failure to
properly determine the status of the removed grain violated
a common law duty to exercise due care and was the
proximate cause of the losses suffered by the plaintiffs.
Appley Bros. V. United States, 924 F. Supp. 944 (D. S.D.
1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The taxpayer
established a 34 year irrevocable unitrust. The trust had two
Section 501(c)(3) foundations as unitrust beneficiaries
which were to receive annually a total of 6 percent of the
fair market value of the trust principal, payable from trust
income, tax-exempt income, net capital gains or principal in
that order. Any undistributed income was accumulated. If
one of the unitrust beneficiaries failed to qualify as a
Section 501(c)(3) foundation, the remaining beneficiary was
to receive all of the unitrust distribution. If both
beneficiaries failed to qualify under Section 501(c)(3), the
trustees were to select a new unitrust beneficiary. The
taxpayer served on the board of one of the trustees and the
trust provided that if a new beneficiary was to be selected, a
national bank was to be named as a replacement co-trustee
for the purpose of selecting the new charitable beneficiary.
At the end of 34 years, the trust principal passed to the
taxpayer’s grandchildren. The IRS ruled that the trust
qualified for the charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9629009,
April 17, 1996.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent’s will
bequeathed $600,000 to the surviving spouse in trust for the
benefit of the decedent’s minor grandchildren. The trust
provided that if the grandchildren died before complete
distribution of the trust, the remainder passed to the
decedent’s child, with final remainders to the decedent’s
heirs. The residue of the estate passed to the decedent’s
child with the provision that if the child predeceased the
decedent, the residue passed to the trust for the
grandchildren. Within nine months after the death of the
decedent, the child executed a disclaimer of any interest in
the residue of the estate passing by the will or intestate
succession. The child did not disclaim the remainder
interest in the trust for the grandchildren. A guardian was
appointed by the state court and the guardian filed a
disclaimer on the behalf of the grandchildren and any
unborn grandchildren of any interest in the residuary estate
of the decedent passing by will or intestate succession. The
effect of the disclaimers was to cause the residuary estate to
pass to the surviving spouse. The IRS ruled that the
disclaimers were effective and the amount passing to the
surviving spouse because of the disclaimers was eligible for
the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9629023, April 23, 1996.
The decedent’s will bequeathed the entire estate to the
surviving spouse but provided that if any portion of the
estate was disclaimed by the spouse, the disclaimed portion
passed to the spouse as trustee and beneficiary of a trust.
The trust provided for distributions to the spouse for the
spouse’s health, education, maintenance and support. The
decedent’s estate included an IRA which was community
property. The spouse disclaimed a fraction of the IRA
sufficient to minimize the federal estate tax on the
decedent’s estate. The disclaimed portion of the IRA was
segregated until a separate IRA was established. The IRS
ruled that the disclaimer was effective and that the trust
would not be included in the spouse’s gross estate because
the spouse did not have a general power of appointment
over trust principal. The IRS ruled that the trust would
recognize the income from the distributions to the trust
resulting from the disclaimed portion of the IRA. The IRS
also ruled that the undisclaimed portion of the IRA which
was rolled over to the spouse’s own IRA qualified as a tax-
free custodian-to-custodian transfer.  Ltr. Rul. 9630034,
April 30, 1996.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent’s will provided for a residuary trust
divided into two parts. The first part was to receive an
amount equal to the decedent’s available GSTT exemption,
with the other part to receive the balance of the residuary
estate. The surviving spouse was the income beneficiary of
both parts of the trust. The estate claimed a marital
deduction for both parts of the trust and filed a Schedule R
but failed to check the box to signify the reverse QTIP
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election for the first part of the trust. However, the Schedule
R was filled out consistent with a reverse QTIP election and
$405,000 of the GSTT exemption was allocated to the first
part of the trust. The IRS ruled that an extension of time for
filing an amended Schedule R to make the reverse QTIP
election was granted but that the GSTT allocation could not
be changed on the amended schedule. Ltr. Rul. 9629014,
April 19, 1996.
In 1966, the decedent’s predeceased spouse’s will
provided for a trust for the decedent. The trust gave the
decedent a testamentary general power of appointment over
trust corpus. If the power of appointment was not exercised,
the trust corpus passed to the predeceased spouse’s issue.
The decedent died in 1993 and the will exercised the power
of appointment by distributing the trust corpus in equal
shares to eight grandchildren, seven of which received
outright distributions and some of which received a
distribution in trust. The estate argued that the distributions
were not subject to GSTT because the original trust was
established before September 25, 1985 and no additions
were made to the trust. The IRS cited Peterson Marital
Trust v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 790 (1994), aff’d, 78 F.3d 795
(2d Cir. 1996) in support of its ruling that the exercise of
the power of appointment caused the distributions to be
subject to GSTT because the exercise was considered a
constructive addition to the trust occurring after 1985. The
existence of the general power of appointment made the
trust includible in the decedent’s gross estate and the
decedent was considered the transferor of the trust corpus.
The IRS ruled that there was no distinguishable difference
between the situation in Peterson where the trust corpus
was distributed in trust to skip persons and this case where
distributions were made directly to skip persons, because
the focus was on the ability of the transferor, the decedent,
to change the distributions of the original pre-1985 trust.
The IRS also cited Treas. Reg. § 26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(D),
Example 1.  Ltr. Rul. 9630003, April 16, 1996.
VALUATION. The decedent died in July 1991 and the
estate included an undivided 50 percent community interest
in 37 percent of the stock of a corporation. The stock was
not publicly traded and was held by the members of three
families. The decedent had participated in a split gift of
stock owned by the decedent’s spouse in April 1991 and the
issue in the case was the value of the stock on the date of
the gift and the date of death. A little over a year after the
death of the decedent, all of the stock in the corporation was
redeemed by the corporation for $75 per share and the
corporation was sold to a third party at that price per share.
The estate argued that the redemption and sale price was
irrelevant for determining the date of death value but the
court held that the sale price was relevant because the sale
was at arm’s length with an unrelated party. The court
adjusted the sales price by 30 percent for the time period
elapsing after the date of death and for the decedent’s
minority interest to determine the date of gift and date of
death value of $50 per share. The ruling is silent as to how
the 30 percent discount figure was reached, except to base it
on the court’s “common sense, knowledge and experience”
because the record did not provide any basis for the court’s
determination.  Scanlan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-
331.
The taxpayers owned stock in a closely-held family
corporation. The stock was subject to transfer restrictions
which restricted the transfer of stock outside the family or
gave the corporation a right of first refusal if any stock was
to be sold outside the family. Although the court
acknowledged that the transfer restriction decreased the
value of the stock for gift tax purposes, the financial
strength of the corporation offset that factor. The court held
that a 30 percent discount for decreased marketability
would be applied to the fair market value of the stock.
Mandelbaum v. Comm’r, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,240 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1995-255.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
COST OF GOODS SOLD. The taxpayer operated a
small farm which raised livestock and crops. The taxpayer’s
returns for several years listed the costs of goods sold for
the purchase and sale of livestock. The taxpayer did not
keep permanent records and failed to substantiate many of
the purchases and sales of livestock. The court held that the
cost of goods sold could not include the costs of livestock
not sold during a taxable year. The taxpayer also valued the
livestock at an estimated fair market value which the court
disallowed because of lack of proof that the fair market
value was less than the taxpayer’s cost in the animals and
because the taxpayer indicated on the return that inventory
was valued at cost. Schroeder v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1996-336.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS. The taxpayers
purchased 59.7 acres of rural land in 1988 for the purpose
of developing the land as a residential subdivision. The
taxpayers had a wetlands assessment made under the 1987
Wetlands Manual published by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers which concluded that the land could be
developed under existing rules. The taxpayers did not file
for a permit to develop the land under the 1988 rules. In
1989, the wetlands manual was changed to the extent that
the taxpayers were advised that the land was protected from
development under the new rules. The taxpayers claimed a
deduction under I.R.C. §§ 169, 1231 for the taking of the
land by the effect of the new regulations. The taxpayers did
not apply for a development permit until 1991. The court
held that the taxpayers were not entitled to an involuntary
conversion loss because no attempt to obtain a permit was
made until well after the new rules were effective. Moore v.
United States, ___ F. Supp. ___ (E.D. Va. 1996).
The taxpayer was a corporation owned, in part, by
another corporation and by individuals. A manufacturing
facility owned by the taxpayer was destroyed by Hurricane
Andrew and the taxpayer received insurance proceeds in
excess of the income tax basis of the destroyed facility. The
taxpayer elected to defer gain under I.R.C. § 1033. The
corporate stockholder purchased a replacement facility and
planned to purchase the individual’s stock in the taxpayer
and liquidate the taxpayer. The IRS ruled that the new
facility did not qualify as replacement property because it
was not purchased by the taxpayer. The IRS ruled that the
reorganization of the taxpayer into the corporate
stockholder did not affect the result because the
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reorganization occurred after the purchase of the new
facility. Ltr. Rul. 9630010, April 23, 1996.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. A general
partnership registered as a limited liability company (LLC)
in another state. Under the state LLC law, the death or
bankruptcy of a member dissolved the LLC. The IRS ruled
that the LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of
continuity. The LLC agreement provided that no new
members may be admitted without the consent of at least
two-thirds of the existing members. The IRS ruled that the
LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of free
transferability of interests; therefore, the LLC would be
taxed as a partnership for federal income tax purposes. Ltr.
Rul. 9630012, April 25, 1996.
PENSION PLANS . For plans beginning in July 1996,
the weighted average is 6.92 percent with the permissible
range of 6.23 to 7.47 percent (90 to 109 percent permissable
range) and 6.23 to 7.61 percent (90 to 110 percent
permissable range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 96-38,
I.R.B. 1996-31, 29.
REPAIRS. The taxpayer purchased two farm properties
which the taxpayer used for raising livestock and crops on a
small scale. Several of the buildings on the properties were
in such disrepair that the taxpayer had them demolished.
The taxpayer refurbished a barn on one property by
prepping, treating and repainting the wood; repounding
nails; replacing a few tin sheets on the roof; sealing nail
holes; and painting the roof. The taxpayer also replaced two
support beams in the barn and built a dividing wall to create
stall space for horses. The IRS argued that all of these
expenses were capital as part of a general plan of
rehabilitation. The court held that the support beams and
new dividing wall were capital expenses but that the other
expenses were currently deductible as repairs. The cost of
demolishing the buildings was to be capitalized. The court
held that the rule of requiring capitalization of all costs of a
general plan of rehabilitation applied only where the costs
were substantial. Here, the only substantial cost was from
demolishing one larger building, a capital cost. Schroeder
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-336.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES.
The taxpayer purchased five racehorses through a
corporation which purchased racehorses for the purposes of
selling interests in the horses to investors. The sole
shareholder of the corporation was the taxpayer’s
accountant. The taxpayer was a medical doctor who also
was in the business of developing champion racehorses. The
taxpayer testified that the five horses were purchased as part
of research into the taxpayer’s theories about developing
racehorses based on bloodlines. The taxpayer’s accountant
advised the taxpayer that the horses were eligible for the
research and development expense deduction and the
taxpayer so claimed the horses on income tax returns. The
court held that the cost of the horses was not a research cost
and disallowed the deduction. The court, however, held that
the taxpayer had reasonably relied on the advice of the
accountant and was not liable for the accuracy-related
penalty of I.R.C. § 6662(a). Sheehy v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-334.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
August 1996
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.15 6.06 6.01 5.98
110% AFR 6.78 6.67 6.62 6.58
120% AFR 7.40 7.27 7.21 7.16
Mid-term
AFR 6.84 6.73 6.67 6.64
110% AFR 7.54 7.40 7.33 7.29
120% AFR 8.24 8.08 8.00 7.95
Long-term
AFR 7.21 7.08 7.02 6.98
110% AFR 7.94 7.79 7.72 7.67
120% AFR 8.68 8.50 8.41 8.35
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer owned a
residence which the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s first wife
used as a principle residence. The couple divorced and the
ex-spouse retained possession of the residence subject only
to division of the proceeds if the house was ever sold. The
taxpayer purchased a residence in another state and
remarried. The first house was eventually sold after the ex-
spouse moved out. The taxpayer presented evidence that the
taxpayer or new spouse resided in the first house during the
year of the sale, but the court rejected the evidence as self-
serving and uncorroborated. The court held that the
taxpayer had to recognize gain from the sale of the first
house because the house was not the taxpayer’s and second
spouse’s principal residence when sold. Bowers v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-333.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. An S corporation
was a debtor in bankruptcy and as part of the reorganization
plan, the corporation reorganized as a new C corporation in
an I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(G) reorganization. The holders of
senior subordinated notes of the S corporation received
stock in the new corporation with a fair market value less
than the amount of the notes. The IRS ruled that the S
corporation realized discharge of indebtedness income from
the exchange of notes for stock but that the income was not
recognized because the corporation was in bankruptcy at the
time of the exchange. Instead, the corporation reduced its
tax attributes to the extent of the discharged indebtedness.
Ltr. Rul. 9629016, April 22, 1996.
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. The taxpayer
owned 51 percent of two corporations. The taxpayer
performed services for these corporations and 30 other
family owned corporations but did not keep any written log
of the hours worked for each corporation or the type of
work performed. The taxpayer provided only general
testimony as to the taxpayer’s recollections of how many
hours were worked for the corporations. The court held that
the testimony was insufficient to substantiate the hours
worked or the type of work performed for the corporations;
therefore, the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that the
taxpayer performed more than 100 hours of work for the
corporation in which the taxpayer owned 51 percent of the
stock. The corporate losses were held to be passive activity
losses.  Speer v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-323.
The taxpayer leased construction equipment and a radio
tower. The taxpayer’s employees negotiated, provided and
monitored the leases, provided security for the tower,
provided maintenance and repairs for the construction
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equipment, and provided general maintenance of the tower
grounds. The taxpayer provided insurance for the
equipment and tower. The IRS ruled that the rental income
from the leases was not passive investment income. Ltr.
Rul. 9630007, April 19, 1996.
TAXPAYER RIGHTS. The Congress has passed and
the President has signed a bill amending the Taxpayer’s Bill
of Rights. The amendments include (1) an increase to
$100,000 in the amount of recovery allowed for lawsuits
against the IRS for reckless collection; (2) an increase in the
ability of the Office of Taxpayer Advocate to intercede on
behalf of taxpayers; (3) a requirement that the IRS notify a
taxpayer of actions against the taxpayer’s spouse or former
spouse for joint liabilities; (4) an increase in the hourly legal
fees recoverable; (5) a requirement that the IRS annually
notify taxpayers of the amount of tax, penalty and interest
currently due; and (6) a requirement that the IRS give 30
days notice before terminating a tax installment payment
agreement. HR 2337, signed July 30, 1996.
GIFTS
COMPLETED GIFT. The father of the debtor owned a
farm consisting of two parcels, 100 acres which included
the residence and a separate 40 acres. The debtor and his
two sons lived on the farm with the father and helped
operate the farm. The father’s will bequeathed the entire
estate to the debtor and the debtor’s brother and the probate
schedules included the entire farm in the estate. The estate
sold the smaller parcel to one of the debtor’s sons but the
probate proceedings were dismissed before the remainder of
the estate was administered. A portion of the 100 acre
parcel was placed in the Conservation Reserve Program and
a portion was leased to a third party, with the rent payments
made to the debtor under both contracts. After a judgment
was recorded against the debtor, the probate proceeding was
reopened and the debtor recorded a deed from the father
which conveyed the 100 acres to the debtor’s brother 32
days before the father’s death. When the debtor filed for
bankruptcy, the 100 acres was not included in the estate.
The deed was signed by the father and the evidence
indicated that the deed was in the brother’s possession soon
after the deed was signed. The court found that the deed
was signed by the father and that delivery of the deed was
completed. The court noted that the activities of the parties
were consistent with transfer of ownership in that the 100
acres were not administered in the first probate proceedings
and that the brother paid the real estate taxes on the
property. The court also noted that, although the CRP and
lease payments were made to the debtor, the brother most
likely allowed these payments to be made to the debtor
because of the debtor’s financial needs. Therefore, the court
held that the deed was sufficient to transfer title to the
property to the debtor’s brother and was not included in the
debtor’s bankruptcy estate. In re Neiderer, 196 B.R. 417
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1996).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
ARTISAN’S LIEN. The debtor had purchased a farm
tractor which was subject to security interests granted to
creditors. The debtor contracted with a repair shop for an
engine overhaul of the tractor. The repair shop repaired the
tractor and returned the tractor to the debtor even though the
repair bill was not paid. The debtor later returned the tractor
to the repair shop for warranty maintenance which the
repair shop performed. This time the repair shop retained
the tractor for nonpayment of the first repair bill and
retained the tractor until ordered by the Bankruptcy Court to
release it to the estate. The repair shop asserted a priority
statutory artisan’s lien for both repair bills, under Mich.
Comp. Laws §§ 570.186, .187. The court held that the
statute creates and continues the lien so long as the artisan
retains possession of the item on which the work was
performed; therefore, because the repair shop released the
tractor after the first repair, the first repair bill was no
longer secured under the artisan’s lien provision. Because
the repair shop retained possession of the tractor after the
second repair, the second repair bill was secured under the
artisan’s lien. The court also held that the lien was not
avoidable because it did not arise as a result of the
bankruptcy filing. In re Lott, 196 B.R. 768 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1996).
ZONING
AGRICULTURAL USE . The defendants owned 24
acres of land in a area zoned residential/agricultural under a
township ordinance. The ordinance prohibited retail sales in
the area. The defendants used the property as their residence
and for farming but also conducted a retail business of
selling horses, tack, feed and wood shavings. The
defendants applied for a special use permit but the permit
was never issued. The defendants stored some of the
inventory in two commercially licensed trailers parked on
the property, although the defendants knew that external
storing and parking of commercial trailers were also
prohibited under the zoning ordinance for the area. Also in
violation of the ordinance, the defendants stored various
pieces of equipment, supplies and storage tanks within view
of the public. The township and defendants attempted to
solve the problem by issuance of a Planned Unit
Development Permit but the defendants failed to comply
with the application requirements and the PUD permit was
not issued. The township then sought to enforce the zoning
requirements. The defendants argued that the township was
estopped from enforcing the zoning restriction because of
the delay in seeking enforcement. The court held that the
township was not estopped because the defendants failed to
show any wrongful conduct by the township and because
the delay was partially caused by the defendants’ failure to
complete the PUD application process. The court also held
that the storage of inventory and the retail sale of horses,
tack, feed and wood shavings were not an agricultural use
of the land because the storage and sales were not part of
livestock or crop production. Stillwater Township v.
Rivard, 547 N.W.2d 906 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
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SEMINAR IN PARADISE
  
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 6-10, 1997
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1997! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar
on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.
The seminar is scheduled for January 6-10, 1997 at the
beautiful ocean-front Royal Waikoloan Resort on the Big
Island, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. each
day, Monday through Friday, with a continental breakfast
and break refreshments included in the registration fee.
Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 400 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning:
Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the
seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment
payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation
and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, handling life insurance, marital
deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax
over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping
transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future
interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden" gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including
income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part
sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living
trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements for
discount air fares on United Airlines and discounts on hotel
rooms at the Royal Waikoloan, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
Watch your mail for more details or call Robert
Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958.
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